Failure to establish robust institutions continues to hinder various sectors in Bangladesh, impeding their progress towards desired objectives. When institutions operate independently and sustainably, they work towards good governance and development. However, when political interference disrupts them, short-term gains take precedence over long-term stability.
Recent events at the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) exemplify this ongoing national challenge. The narrative involving three former national cricket captains—Faruque Ahmed, Aminul Islam Bulbul, and Tamim Iqbal—illustrates not just power transitions but also how external influences repeatedly disrupt the governance of what should be an autonomous body.
Faruque’s ascension to the BCB presidency in August 2024, following the departure of then-board chief Nazmul Hassan Papon due to changes in the Awami League government, initially sparked hopes of reform in the national cricket regulatory body. However, his subsequent removal less than a year later, followed by a politically charged return as vice-president after the October 2025 election, highlights the fragile nature of leadership roles within the BCB. This pattern repeated with Aminul Islam Bulbul, who was initially appointed president through a National Sports Council-supported process, then elected in a highly contested election, only to be ousted amid allegations and counterclaims six months later. Now, the abrupt emergence of Tamim Iqbal at the helm of an ad hoc committee, accompanied by individuals with clear political ties, continues the cycle of uncertainty.
Frequent changes in leadership, driven or influenced by government intervention, significantly weaken the institutional foundation of the BCB, ultimately harming cricket in the country.
Every new administration in Bangladesh pledges to keep sports free from political influence. The recently appointed state minister for youth and sports, Md Aminul Haque, reiterated this commitment. Nonetheless, the unfolding events at the BCB indicate that these assurances are easier said than done.
The disbandment of Aminul’s elected board and the establishment of an 11-member ad hoc committee led by Tamim, tasked with organizing an election within 90 days, have exposed deep institutional vulnerabilities. This issue goes beyond individual conflicts; it stems from unresolved constitutional contradictions. At the core of the crisis lies the BCB constitution, which, instead of safeguarding the board’s autonomy, allows for external interference. A pivotal concern is the role of the National Sports Council (NSC), the government’s top sports oversight agency, which can nominate two directors to the BCB board. This provision institutionalizes government involvement in the cricket body, creating a fundamental contradiction: a supposedly autonomous board structurally accommodating external influences.
The BCB constitution also permits NSC intervention, including the dissolution of an elected body, as witnessed in recent events. While such authority may be warranted in exceptional circumstances, its broad and vague scope leaves room for discretionary use.
The problem also lies in the councillor nomination process. The provision allowing district sports associations to send representatives “if” no district cricket association exists has been exploited. This ambiguity has facilitated manipulation of the electoral process, undermining the integrity of elections before they begin. The constitution should prioritize district cricket associations, similar to district football associations in football governance, with clear eligibility criteria for councillors.
These structural deficiencies stem from a crucial moment in the board’s history: the contentious 2012 constitutional amendment. During that time, amendments to the BCB constitution were introduced but were later altered by the NSC before approval. This raised significant legal concerns about the extent of the NSC’s authority. The issue was eventually brought to court, which affirmed the BCB’s autonomy to frame and amend its constitution while mandating only approval—rather than alteration—by the NSC.
The court’s decision was a pivotal juncture, reinforcing institutional autonomy and providing the BCB with an opportunity to rectify governance flaws. However, this chance was missed.
Rather than addressing the revealed inconsistencies, the BCB proceeded with elections under the same disputed framework. This decision effectively sanctioned a flawed structure instead of reforming it. The failure to rectify the issues stemming from 2012 has continued to haunt the institution, with each subsequent crisis tracing back to those unresolved matters. Therefore, the latest incident is not an isolated occurrence but a continuation of that historical legacy.
The centralized nature of the BCB is another constitutional weakness. Despite a longstanding commitment to decentralize cricket administration, power remains heavily concentrated in Dhaka. Club representatives, particularly from established clubs in the capital, dominate the board. Out of 25 directors, a substantial number (12) come from club affiliations, a disparity seldom observed in other cricketing nations. This bias entrenches a limited power base and sidelines regional cricket development.
With 25 members, the BCB boasts the largest board of directors among all Test-playing nations—more than double the size of most and even triple that of some. This raises the inevitable question: why?
Following the AL government’s removal, there was optimism that the interim authority would use
